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Foreword 
Organised crime is widely perceived as an increasing threat to the well-being of our societies. 
Moreover the internationalisation of criminal activities means that no country can feel completely 
secure within its borders at the same time when the danger of all-out military confrontation has 
receded with the end of the Cold War. At European level, the need for international collective action 
against organised crime has found expression in the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty dealing with 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. The further development of European policies 
and forms of cooperation in these areas is one of the major issues of the Intergovernmental 
Conference convened in 1996 to revise the Treaty. 
The present document contains a series of contributions on the problems of fighting organised crime 
due to well-known Italian experts. 
One could hardly try to encapsulate in a few words the wealth of observation and analysis provided by 
these studies. It is possible, however, to detect a common message that runs across the different 
contributions and that is relevant for Europe: 
• while having its historic roots in particular social and political circumstances organised crime is 
not a local phenomenon. It has taken a global character and extends its reach to the extent to 
which the conditions of the 'rule of law' are compromised or missing. This basic realisation 
should underlie a grand strategy for the fight against organised crime; 
• more specifically, not only the repression but also the prevention of organised crime require a 
much higher degree of international cooperation than obtains at present. Hence the importance of 
the conclusions of the IGC on this matter. 
The experts took part in the preparation of a report on organised crime published by the Fondazione 
Rosselli in 1995 1• Following the publication of the Report and in the framework of the informal 
cooperation existing between the Fondazione Rosselli and the Forward Studies Unit, a seminar was 
organised in Brussels to present some findings particularly relevant to the understanding of the 
phenomenon of organised crime at European level'. The texts contained in the present document were 
put together for the purpose of the seminar. They have been subsequently translated into English and 
re-arranged for presentation as a single document. 
The authors of the contributions are: Maurizio Fiasco, sociologist, contributing an assessment of the 
social, economic and geopolitical significance of organised crime in the Mediterranean area and the 
latest developments of the anti-mafia fight in Italy; Pier Luigi Vigna, magistrate, contributing his 
expertise on the expansion and interpenetration of organised crime following the fall of the 'Iron 
Curtain'; Donato Masciandaro, economist, contributing an analysis of money-laundering activities 
linked to organised crime. 
Fondazione Rossellli, Secondo Rapporto sulle Priorita' Nazionali. La Criminalita' 
Organizzata, Milano: Mondadori, 1995. 
2 Organised Criminality and Security in Europe, Seminar organised by the Forward Studies 
Unit, European Commission and the Fondazione Rosselli, Bussels, 18 October 1995. 
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The translation of the text was undertaken by the Commission's Translation Services. 
The final revision of the text was undertaken by Lucio R. Pench (Forward Studies Unit). 
Helpful assistance in the preparation of the document was given by Sylvie Bares 
(Forward Studies Unit). 
Jerome VIGNON Riccardo VIALE 
Principal Advisor, Forward Studies Unit Director, Fondazione Rosselli 
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I. Mafia(s) in the Mediterranean and the fight against 
organized crime in Italy 
By Maurizio Fiasco 3 
1 Mafia(s) in the Mediterranean: a geopolitical picture 
1.1 Mafia as a mediterranean phenomenon 
Until not so long ago mafia was used in the singular, as a synonym for Sicily's "Cosa Nostra". Gradually, 
adjectives have come to be associated with it: the Turkish, Chinese, Colombian, Japanese mafia ... More 
recently, in the 90s, the Russian and Bulgarian mafia appeared and now the newly born Yugoslav mafia 
and its Albanian and Greek neighbours. The term may now be used in the plural: the new mafias. 
Are we witnessing, in the most diverse settings, the criminal ascent of a "bourgeoisie whose development 
has been thwarted" and is being co-opted onto the ruling class? Is history confirming the traditional, 
paradigmatic definition of mafia put forward by the parliamentary committee set up in the early 70s?• 
Only twenty years have gone by but, given the exceptional vitality of criminal organizations, it might well 
have been a century. The turbulent growth of illicit markets is forcing us to review tried and trusted 
theoretical foundations to look at the mafia as a structural component of contemporary geopolitics, 
defined as the endless interplay of equilibrium and tension which so characterizes the Mediterranean, one 
of the planet's most unstable regions. But before looking at the mafia as a phenomenon common along the 
shores of this "landlocked sea", we should consider for a moment the meaning given to the word in a 
recent past, when Sicily and mafia could not be dissociated. 
It is true that already in the early 60s other forms of organized crime were appearing in the Mediterranean 
area. The French Connection for instance, which at the time indicated Marseilles drug dealers, the 
"cousins" - the word is theirs - of the Sicilian men of honour. Other minor, mostly rural, traditions, have 
their roots in the South and in the toe of Italy: camorra from Naples and 'ndrangheta from Calabria, 
families of brigands [malandrini], in the expression used by the Onorata societa. Elderly smugglers still 
remember the existence of a camburra in the Salento region of Apulia, and groups of bandits and robbers 
worked undisturbed in the Gargano region even during the twenty years of fascist rule. "Sacra Corona" -
today the fourth most powerful mafia in Italy - in the late 18th century was only a sect founded by a priest 
in the Bari province. 
But despite the variegated landscape which prevailed three decades ago, the Sicilian mafia alone was 
known for a pronounced and dreadful peculiarity: a tendency to collude with politicians, an ability to enter 
into complex negotiations with the State and, explicitly since the Allies' landing in Sicily in 1943, its own 
sphere of influence, a power to rule - and to exercise social control - in the countryside and, later, in the 
post-war years, even in the towns. 
It was Cosa Nostra which determined the voting behaviour of deputies and senators and exploited its 
connivance with the landed aristocracy, whose dirty work it did when rioting farm hands clamoured for 
land reform in the first ten years after the fall of fascism. The Societa gradually evolved, mirroring 
changes in the economic and social balance of power in Italy in the second half of the 20th century. 
Having established its rule on the land, it focused on getting a share of the funds intended for 
reconstruction work and eventually concluded a pact with the "interventionist state" in the golden age of 
3 Sociologist, head of the Microdel research project on urban crime. 
4 Mafia - in the original analysis ofltalian political scholars who devoted much time to it after the war - is regarded as an 
aspect of the more general problem of the Italian South. Even its overseas counterpart, US-based Cosa Nostra, is seen as a 
variant linked with immigration from the South, which towards the end of the last century had reached biblical proportions. 
Organized Criminality and Security in Europe 7 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Later, following the shift in the balance of power, it moved on to influence 
Politics with a capital p, as we heard at the trial of senator Giulio Andreotti. More recently still it has made 
its presence felt at a crucial time in Italian history, as highlighted in recent investigations on the repeated 
attempts to pervert democracy in the 1994 general elections in Sicily and Calabria. 
1.2 From "made in Sicily" to universal model: crime as a substitute for 
modernisation 
But how did the mafia ever become a universal model? « ... [the mafia] has long been a model for 
organized crime. This substantial uniformity allows us to use the term "mafia" lato sensu for all the 
most important criminal organizations»5• These are among the last words spoken by Giovanni Falcone, 
days before his death in Capaci. 
The "Mediterranean" mafias have availed themselves of the set of crime management tools developed by 
Cosa Nostra with skill and hard work. Skimming-off activities develop into the systematic control over the 
entire economic cycle, not only wealth redistribution but also wealth creation. Thus, no longer solely 
concerned with the "terminals" of wealth, the mafia has developed into an entity which controls all stages 
of wealth production.'· 
Giovanni Falcone identified a structural change that accounts for the model's growth potential, namely 
the move from exchange between two distinct entities (violent organised crime and white-collar 
crime) to the direct engagement of Cosa Nostra's formal structure of more complex criminal activities 
in the economic sphere. 
«The findings of the most recent investigations carried out by the judicial police - explained the 
magistrate in two talks given in 1991 - show that organized crime is beginning to do without white-
collar crime, by which we mean that within the criminal organizations themselves a category of 
individuals is beginning to appear whose task is not to carry out typically criminal activities, but to 
manage and recycle the enormous sums of money obtained from criminal activities. The dangers of 
such a development are clear to all, for it will be increasingly difficult to combat effectively the 
activities of mafia organizations. Up to now one of the most effective investigation techniques has 
consisted in the close scrutiny of assets and bank accounts belonging to individuals who might well 
have been unscrupulous and show little inclination to abide by the law, but who were not members of 
criminal organizations. Obviously investigations will be that much more arduous when they concern 
members of the mafia and other similar organizations!» 
The scenario outlined by Falcone has not attracted much attention since, but the implications remain 
alarming: «The dreaded link - up - insists Falcone - between an increasingly violent organized crime and 
ever more unscrupulous white - collar crime is a thing of the past since, as we have said, business crime 
now falls within the province of the criminal organizations themselves».7 Falcone fully grasped the extent 
of the structural changes taking place in relations between the mafia, politics and business: lawful 
business activities are being turned into illicit ones. 
With the help of such powerful know-how, the mafia shows remarkable entrepreneurial flair, particularly 
striking in those countries where society is a living fossil: in the former Socialist bloc where, after half a 
century of hibernation, countries find themselves suddenly pulled into the complexities of market 
economy, in the age of multinational oligopolies. One can easily imagine the impact of "liberal" 
economies crossing the path of mass societies where no cultural adjustments and no attitudes exist to 
temper the predatory instinct of capitalist accumulation. «When transactions between private individuals -
explains economist Stefano Zamagni - take place against a background of mutual lack of trust and 
5 G. Falcone, Che cosa e la mafia, transcription of a talk given in Central America, postumously published in "Micro 
Mega", 3, 1992. 
6 Cfr. S. Zamagni, Criminalita organizzata e dilemmi della mutua sfiducia: sulla persistenza dell'equilibrio mafioso, in S. 
Zamagni ( editor), Mercati illegali e mafie, II Mulino, Bologna 1993. 
7 G. Falcone, Criminalita organizzata e gestione de! flusso degli affari, in La difesa delle istituzioni locali dalla criminalita 
degli affari, Vol.1, Consiglio regionale de! Lazio, Roma 1992. 
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uncertainty concerning the intentions of the other party, it is only natural that a demand for protection, a 
generalized demand for dispute-settlement services should appear».' 
And this is precisely the "replacement service" that the mafia imposes wherever war or simply the 
disintegration of the socio-political system upset the balance. And it is astonishing just how much 
scope criminal entrepreneurship can have in societies informed by anthropological beliefs which are 
shaken to their foundations, when people hitherto governed with the camaraderie of the barracks are 
confronted with the daily fight for survival. 
«It's a bit like the Far West, it makes you feel more alive» said a young entrepreneur from Lombardy to 
the newspaper of the Italian association of industrialists last summer, after a year in Tirana where he had 
gone «to put himself to the test».' Selection is nothing short of darwinian. It is the ruthless, the adventurers 
who succeed, since homo economicus does not evolve spontaneously. For half a century the population 
was kept unaware of the laws of economic interaction, and it is traumatic to revert to "free competition" 
armed only with the memory of pre-capitalist, pre-war social structures. In today's wild-west societies of 
the former Socialist bureaucracies it is the gunslingers, the real bandits who move with ease; in other 
words: the mafioso entrepreneurs. They succeed in settling with a modicum of credibility both the 
transactions within the black economy and those between the criminal and the lawful sides of the 
economy. 
This is the novelty, in comparison with the Wild-West Italy of the period immediately following the war, 
when the regulatory structures set up by the fascist corporatist state broke down. Crime is asserting itself 
as the prime substitute for modernization in Eastern Europe and on the shores of the Mediterranean. The 
mafia is updating "traditional" concepts and, once more, sectors of the "bourgeoisie whose development 
has been thwarted" are finding unusual paths to success, in a re-run of the criminal way to economic 
miracle. 
1.3 The effects of war 
In contemporary organized crime there is an overall balance resulting from the interaction of various 
components. Any change, any incident affecting a load-bearing component in the structure of illicit 
trade results in a reshuffle, with new maps being drawn and new hierarchies appearing. It is in the 
Mediterranean, the world's most interdependent region, that the interdependence of illicit markets is 
most visible. When in 1960 the free port of Tangier closed down, cigarette smuggling found a new 
operational home in Naples and warehouses were built on Yugoslav and Albanian coasts. In the same 
period Algeria became independent and immediately afterwards the North African-Marseille axis lost 
the monopoly of trade in morphine base and the privilege of refining heroin for the US market. 
Other political and military events of the last twenty-five years have had immediate repercussions on the 
prosperity, or indeed the decline, of mafias in the countries bordering the Mediterranean. In 1974 the 
conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus broke out, and membership of NATO did not prevent 
Turkey from blackmailing the US by easing the movement of heroin between Anatolia and the New 
World. Not to mention the war between Iran and Iraq, to which we owe the "innovation" of exchanging 
weapons for drugs, which have since become a standard means of payment. Or the fact that State-owned 
arms manufacturers, with the help of Italian State-controlled banks, lent themselves to three-way deals 
involving orders and payments. Even civilized and solidarity-prone Sweden has agreed for many years to 
divert arms consignments from the false buyers (countries not at war) to the real clients (countries 
involved in conflicts). 
The long years of civil war in Lebanon, which broke out "in sympathy" during the half century of 
Arab-Israeli conflict, had an impact on the role of Beirut. From tax haven in the 60s, the city has 
become the centre where heroin and hashish are cross-traded, along the old Mediterranean smugglers' 
8 S. Zamagni, op. cit. (our italics). 
9 G. Donelli, Tirana e un trampolino per i mercati dell'Est, "II Sole-24 ore", I August 1995. 
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highway linking the Lebanese capital, Cyprus (with Limassol as a leading off-shore banking centre to 
which payments are made), Albania and Apulia. 
It is at that time, for instance, that rnafia-like organizations with a strong regional flavour, such as the one 
operating in Apulia, grew in importance. Local criminal groups capitalized on Apulia's position as the 
main entry point for illicit imports of drugs from Turkey with destination Milan and continental Europe. 
Investigations made in the early 80s on drug couriers between Milan and Trani show that the flow runs 
from Apulia to Lombardy and not viceversa. 
However, we had to wait for the most serious war to hit the Mediterranean region since 1945 to see the 
heel of Italy become the new geopolitical node of organized crime. Both for logistic reasons (the 
proximity to Yugoslavia) and because of the specific features of Apulia's own black economy (smuggling, 
control over local banks, interests in the marketing of farm product), the Sacra Corona Unita then 
succeeded in making the quantum leap to become a first-rate rnafia. It now controls negotiations 
concerning strategic commodities (from cereals for the Maghreb countries to conventional weapons, from 
drugs to materials used in the development of nuclear systems of mass destruction, from money made by 
trafficking to money illegally invested by criminals and tax-evaders in the new financial centres of the 
Balkans). 
Evidence is building up. We have the statements made by the pentiti*, such as Trani-born Annacondia, 
and repeated discoveries of caches of weapons full of the UZI sub-machine gun and the Kalashnikov rifles 
popular with gangs all over Europe, as well as heavy weapons. Vast organizations specializing in the 
laundering of money from three continents have been unmasked, such as the one exposed by the 
Operation Dinero, successfully concluded in September 1994 by the US, Italian, Canadian and German 
police. And recently there have been signs that the network of big dealers in nuclear weapons which was 
exposed in 1987 with the impounding in the port of Bari of the Lebanese vessel "Boustany I" is still in 
existence.10 The episode confirmed the importance of the Adriatic sea and the Apulian ports for the 
supply of weapons and ammunition to Iran and Iraq which had been fighting for eight years. Soon 
afterwards came the terrible confirmation in the form of the discovery in a villa in Squinzano, on the coast 
near Brindisi, of the headquarters of an organization acting as brokers of entire weapon systems: ballistic 
missiles, submarines, fighter planes, even nuclear weapons. And here the pattern of trafficking displays a 
new feature in that the same network handles guns, tanks and bombs, but is also pursuing a large-scale 
project to store industrial waste, including nuclear waste, in African countries. It becomes apparent that the 
illegal arms trade network has diversified its activities: it manages three-way deals covering a large range 
of prohibited high-risk goods such as toxic industrial waste. 
The war in Yugoslavia reactivated the circuits of illicit trade in arms which had been established during 
the Iran-Iraq conflict and had since fallen into disuse, particularly after the Gulf War. Thus, in the 
geopolitical framework oflarge-scale trafficking, Apulia's coast and hinterland have grown in importance. 
In the early days of the crisis which was to turn into protracted bloodshed, Apulia was already serving as 
the terminal of the arms circuit. Arms entered Italy from the Trieste border crossing and reach the region 
north of Bari and the Salento after long journeys by road. When the conflict in Slovenia came to an end 
Translator's note: literally, "those who repent": convicted criminals turned informers in exchange for leniency. 
10 In early September 1987 the "Boustany I", a vessel flying the Lebanese flag, is impounded in the port of Bari following 
the discovery of weapons and drugs on board. The investigations had been launched by the public prosecution office attached to 
the court of Massa Carrara. Some forty people of various nationalities, businessmen and members of criminal organizations from 
Italy, Lebanon, Greece and Spain, are charged during the enquiry. 
A certain Aldo Anghessa, with Italian and Swiss nationality, is said to be responsible for informing the authorities. According to 
the newspapers, he had escaped from the Bellinzona prison, in the Canton Ticino (CH), before reaching Bari, where he 
allegedly informed detectives of the cargo loaded on the Lebanese ship. Apparently he had left a suitcase with papers concerning 
the arms trade in a local hotel. 
Beyond the sensation caused by the news, the background to the event appears immediately very ambiguous and no light is 
thrown including Italy, but no official confirmation is forthcoming. It is even suggested that weapons and drugs have been 
"planted" in Bari to divert investigations on the vast traffic in military ware which had been keeping various public prosecutions 
offices busy for a year and a half. Over the next few weeks, detectives reiceved reports that no less than six ships likely to carry 
weapons were due to dock at the port. 
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and the guns in northern Croatia remained silent, the crossing became impossible since the Slovene 
government would not tolerate illicit traffics following its application for accession to the European 
Union. Thus, the arms circuits have rapidly come to coincide with those used by cigarette smugglers and 
the principal nodes have moved to Montenegro and Albania. Movements of illicit goods are not hindered 
by the embargo in force which, while prohibiting exports to former Yugoslavia, has failed to introduce any 
serious measure to stop goods from leaving those territories. 
The fighting in the Balkans has affected the drug routes from the Middle East and Asia. Drugs reach Italy 
first and then Germany and North America. Traffic between Greece and Apulia is growing. Hashish 
arrives from Morocco and Lebanon across the Adriatic sea and enters Italy from the Salento and the coast 
north of Bari. On Albanian territory traffickers feel safe enough to establish warehouses and mobile heroin 
refineries. In the Valona hinterland and between Fier and Argirocastro cannabis is grown and is then 
shipped to Greece. But war, much more than drugs, is responsible for raising the profile of the arms 
network beyond all expectations. 
The Sacra Corona Unital (SCU) - a mafia-like organization primarily active in the Salento region of 
Apulia and with an internal structure not unlike the 'ndrangheta's of Calabria - is the first to invest in 
strategic bases on the other side of the Adriatic sea. After the blows dealt to it between 1991 and 1993, 
the SCU transfers its headquarters to Montenegro, attracted by that Republic's institutional disarray 
which provides a safe hide-out for its members on the run from Italian justice. Sanctuary is guaranteed 
where judicial cooperation with Italy is non-existent or the fighting goes on. From their new 
headquarters the big-name fugitives from Brindisi soon sample the opportunities afforded by the war 
to put their assets to good use, namely the use of the smuggling network to move shipments of arms 
and cash and the links between the Far East and Europe. Around the original group from the Salento 
there gathers a circle of criminals from Bari, Sicily and Calabria. 
Why do official authorities in Serbia-Montenegro abet such criminal to-ing and fro-ing? Because mafias 
break the embargo: they provide much needed cash (the premium for establishing a safe operational base 
is in the region of LIT 10 billion. Multiply this by n-times: the government stands to gain in excess of 
LIT 1000 billion) and bring in weapons and explosives. 
1.3.1 Apulian versatility: from smuggling to arms and drug trafficking 
Sucked into the vortex of such huge profits, the old, "harmless" smuggling activities are brought up to 
date, so to speak Things start moving as soon as the SCU realizes the usefulness of the system which 
supports the illicit trade in tobacco goods in establishing and coordinating the vast network of illicit war-
related trafficking. It is not by chance, it must be said, that some local politicians from the Salento region 
have been involved in these new activities: the old link with the smugglers pulls them in. 
Who are the Mediterranean "shipowners" most used to shifting large loads of illicit goods? It must be the 
smugglers, both because of their assets (the vessels) and the network of collusive contacts needed to move 
and store the cargo. Yesterday it was only cigarettes, today it is other, more lucrative goods: heroin and 
hashish; weapons and cash. The structures supporting such traffic are very solid since the time when 
leading brands of cigarettes set up factories and tobacco warehouses in the Balkans.11 
Even before attracting the interest of the Apulian mafia, the smuggler is a pioneer, a criminal-cum-investor 
working relentlessly on the other side of the Adriatic sea. He has gained considerable experience. In 
Montenegro for years he has had the opportunity to make deals with the local underworld, the State 
bureaucracy (traditionally corruption-prone) and with those few ware locals with money to invest. 
It is interesting to see how the SCU has succeeded in harnessing the smugglers' network as soon as it 
assumes strategic relevance. Before the arrival of organized crime, a host of small but highly specialized 
bands were operating on both sides of the Adriatic sea involving thousands of people, either as "operators" 
or, above all, as subscribers putting up the small sums needed to purchase the individual consignments 
making up the cargo. A sort of very short-term, working-class "unit trust". The fragmented and grass-roots 
character of smuggling is not suppressed when the mafia takes over, one of the reasons being that it makes 
11 Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia are producers of manufactured tobacco legally consumed in Europe. 
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it more difficult to identify the hierarchy and, conversely, it allows traffic to continue even when single 
segments of the organization are dismantled by the police. «SCU's most powerful and impressive man -
we read in a police report on Benedetto Stano, successor to Giuseppe Rogoli, the founder - much feared 
by his own men, has succeeded in setting up a large number of small satellite organizations»: 12 in a 
nutshell, operational flexibility combined with centralized leadership in negotiating the big deals. 
It goes without saying that organizational cohesion and control over the use of violence remain essential 
features, so that when the war brings about the exceptional development of illicit markets, Apulia's 
"entrepreneurial mafia" is ready to capitalize on a valuable asset, namely its ability to ensure that there is 
sufficient mutual trust among all the "black investors", including the non-criminal ones. If a particular 
sector is of no direct interest to the organization - such as the introduction of illegal immigrant workers -
the SCU simply demands a cut from the new black entrepreneurs who take it up. 11 
It is a method applicable to anyone keen to speculate in the virgin lands of former Yugoslavia. Even the 
more established mafias, Cosa Nostra first and foremost, must avail themselves of SCU brokers, who, as a 
result, are now treated as equals and enjoy the international respectability that Pino Rogoli's marauders 
lacked. 
Only the 'ndrangheta, operating in the provinces of Reggio Calabria and Catanzaro, can boast such a wide 
operational network, through which for over twenty years it has been running branches across the Atlantic 
(US, Canada, Ecuador, Venezuela), in Australia, the Middle East (Lebanon, Turkey) and in the Far East 
(Thailand), as well as in four European countries (Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and France). 
It is not a coincidence that in September 1991, only a few weeks before fighting starts in Slovenia and 
Croatia, 'ndrangheta in-fighting comes to an end and the thirty families in the Reggio Calabria province 
conclude a strategic pact establishing "Cosa Nuova": the first unified command structure in Calabria. 
1.3.2 The pendulum of war: the mafias as instrument of the balance of power in the 
Mediterranean? 
It would be unforgivable not to mention - as the images of atrocities in Bosnia and Kraijna appear on our 
screens - what happened during another war fought near us. During the ten years of fighting between 
Khomeini's and Saddam Hussein's troops the entire arms trade circuit underwent a mighty shake-up to 
circumvent the official embargo and move goods which had become illicit using transactions on which 
authorities would close their eyes. Worse still, illicit operations run by the secret services began to take 
shape and acquire considerable importance. Governments, whilst officially observing the UN embargo, 
were promoting a "special policy" towards both countries at war. 
If the Iran-Contra affair should be recalled today, it is to warn of the risk that the same might happen with 
Yugoslavia. In the same way as the CIA in 1986 allowed army supplies to the "enemy" Khomeini to 
obtain funds with which to finance the Contra guerillas in Nicaragua, it is conceivable that someone might 
adopt the same "pendulum tactics". In the years of the bloodbath in Mesopotamia, whenever Iraq 
appeared to be having the upper hand, the pendulum was switched on to boost Iran's war potential. 
Conversely, if the ayatollahs gained ground, then the US government would send supplies to Iraq, 
officially this time. 
The mechanism which in 1986 - in the years of the "war on drugs" waged by President Bush - produced 
the Iran-Contra affair could spring into action again. The exceptionally long conventional conflict 
provided the world illicit drug trade with the opportunity to raise its profile as a means to fund the 
12 Brindisi police headquarters, flying squad, Jnfonnativa di denuncia a carico di Andria/a piu alri, 9 June 1994. 
13 The introduction of illegal immigrants via the Lecce "corridor" is not controlled by the SCU but by recylcled Italian 
swindlers and bankrupts. The collection centre in Albania is run by an organization established in the ports of Durazzo and 
Vallona, where false papers are also provided. «Many such papers belong to nationals of former Yugoslavia who died in the 
conflict» (Nicola Piacente, public prosecutor at the court of Brindisi during an interview given to "Narcomafie", July/ August 
1995.) 
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purchase of weapons, obviously in collusion with government circles and the General Staff. Thus, the 
drug and arms circuits teamed up and became interdependent. 
There are therefore very good reasons to fear that the manoeuvre is being repeated in former 
Yugoslavia. Incredibly enough, four years went by since the first skirmishes and the first shootings. 
Too many to rely solely on the resources of the individual republics involved in the conflict. Just when 
it looked as if the Serbs were about to prevail, suddenly the Croats found the means of reconquering 
land they had abandoned three years earlier, and public opinion was led to believe, mistakenly, that the 
Bosnians might yet pull themselves out of the hole of Sarajevo by military action. Obviously the 
pendulum of fortune swung more than could reasonably be expected. Who else was involved, through 
the arms trade, besides the "International" of the Mediterranean mafias? This question is more than 
legitimate, since depending on the calibre of the alliances - always strategic ones, be they with the 
State, the military or the financial circles - concluded by organized crime, the whole mafia issue might 
have entered a completely new era. The ultimate scenario might involve a multinational imperialism of 
the drug barons and arm dealers. 
Having allowed a sophisticated network of collusive relationships to be built, Montenegro has become a 
new free port where criminal organizations from various countries and cultural backgrounds all converge: 
Campania's camorra and Cosa Nostra, the Chinese mafia, the Turkish clans and the brokers of Limassol. 
New partnerships are made there. Undaunted by fears of cultural or ethnic "contamination", the 
Mediterranean mafias are carving out their respective spheres of influence. All this acts as a powerful 
stimulus for a number of new phenomena which find in the operational safety of Montenegro the medium 
on which to develop. Italian mafias are showing more inclination to strike deals, increasing the vertical 
integration between organizations from Bari, Sicily, Calabria and Naples. Recently, the Sardinians have 
appeared on the scene: they are the latest "ethnic group" to take advantage of the criminal integration 
which is taking place in the Mediterranean. 
1.3.3 The scale of the interests involved 
To form an idea of the income generated by the brokerage of illicit sales of arms and the scale of the 
interests involved, it might be useful to look at the fees legally received by international salesmen 
clinching deals during peacetime. Commissions paid are declared and therefore authorized when the 
authorities approve the procurement and the movement of the goods. They used to be mentioned in the 
papers of the "Advisory committee on brokerage fees", which was still functioning in the 80s and was 
attached to the Italina Ministry for Foreign Trade. The committee gave the necessary endorsement to the 
official representatives of the parties involved in the sale of arms and armament. In the 80s, when war 
was a distant problem for Europe, both east and west, commissions ranged between 5% (rarely) and 
15%.14 
If this is the size of the remuneration on operations carried out with the authorities' knowledge, it is easy to 
imagine the size of the kickbacks paid on illicit deals. All those who help circumvent prohibitions and 
elude controls receive huge cuts, starting from the shipowners who charge four times the normal price for 
the service. Operations often take place under the protective cover provided by government officials, party 
members, former secret service agents and administrators of import-export firms which normally deal 
with companies in the producer countries. They have a new partner in organized crime which finds 
legitimacy in the fulfilment of two complementary functions: the mobilization of the transport network 
and the provision of funds for the purchase of the goods. In short, government authorities wishing to 
export or import weapons illegally allow mafia organizations to develop their drug and tobacco trafficking 
activities and to launder the profits using traditional currency fraud devices. 
14 For the supply to Malaysia of four minesweepers built by the company Intermarine - worth LIT 180 billion - LIT 23.5 
billion was paid in commissions to a Singapore account. The beneficiary was Djiatra Soln Bhd, Kuala Lumpur. When the 
company Oto Melara sold 200 armoured battle vehicles, complete with weapons and accessories, to Saudi Arabia - worth 
USO 300 million - -
a certain Reem Est du Vaduz and Mitsa Ltd, Jersey, received USO 31.5 million. The day Selenia sold 16 Aspide missiles to 
Greece, Albert S. Modiano (Greece) pocketed USD 233 OOO on a deal worth USD 4.5 billion, i.e. 5%. But Cbf Financial Service 
Ltd (Canada) demanded Agusta 10% on the sale of helicopters to Egypt: USD 2.5 million on the USD 25 million deal». And so 
on. The article notes that the "commission" is paid abroad. (Mino Fucillo, Tangente? Mettiamoci un timbro, in "La Repubblica", 
2 December 1986). 
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2 The fight against organized crime in Italy: a national priority 
2.1 The fight against mafia: the limits of traditional investigation? 
After the resounding successes recently scored by the Italian State, is the fight against mafia going 
through a period of crisis which will lead to further development? During the first twelve years since the 
entry into force of the Rognoni-La Torre Act (1983) over 13 OOO seizures of property belonging to 
persons charged with mafia crimes have been carried out - a total value of nearly LIT 4 OOO billion. But 
only one in four seizure orders were held up in court, and already property worth over LIT 1200 billion 
has been returned to individuals charged with serious organized crime offences. The value of property 
definitively appropriated by the State following confiscation is in the region of LIT 700 billion. 
Just as striking is the disproportion between the wealth of rules produced to deter banks from laundering 
money and the number of times they proved effective in preventing dirty money from circulating and 
providing detectives with compelling evidence for their inquiries. The few hundred reports received - a 
drop in the ocean of millions of banking transactions - clearly point at the imbalance between the 
procedures, their cost and the results obtained. 
And yet organized crime and criminal economy are the two sides of the same coin, and money laundering 
is of great significance, not per se, as a phenomenon separate from the more general context of black 
economy, but as an essential component thereof .. It is therefore vain to combat money laundering without 
fighting criminal economy with determination. And it is impossible to do so without improving the quality 
of investigations into the activities of mafioso entrepreneurs. 
It is now clear that shortcuts based on prevention measures are often deceptive. The most effective 
strategy when carrying out investigations on property in connection with organized crime is to use the 
complex but ultimately rewarding tool of criminal investigations. But to combat money laundering and 
the criminal economy it is necessary to change a habit common among detectives and public prosecution 
magistrates which consists in shelving investigations on property, once evidence has been found to 
substantiate charges made against the accused. Thus, even in the case of large-scale judiciary 
investigations based on the lengthy statements made by the pentiti, often very limited inquiries are carried 
out, thereby missing the opportunity to obtain more sizeable results. This practice explains the 
discrepancy between the number of provisional seizures of mafia men's property and the number of 
definitive confiscation orders issued. 
Investigations on property should on the contrary become the core of any inquiry dealing with organized 
crime. 
2.2 Organized crime and political and administrative corruption 
Crime policies focusing on the economic/financial area are in line with the issues raised by magistrates 
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in their last lucid, if unheeded, statements. They asserted that the 
incorporation of criminal business activities into Cosa Nostra's formal structure accounted for the 
emergence and instant growth of certain oligopolistic groups in the 70s. The two magistrates had focused 
their research on mafia's new patterns of operation. Their research paths which are the most far-reaching 
and up-to-date expression of the best anti-mafia tradition. 
Under the traditional and now mostly obsolete distinction, politics had clear supremacy over crime when 
it came to corrupt economic links. In other terms, even against a background of collusive agreements, the 
political and business "lobbies" exercised a regulatory function vis-a-vis the mafia operating in the field. 
Where public works contracts were concerned, for instance, such lobbies had an exclusive influence on 
decisions concerning the type of works to be financed, their location, planning, the delivery of funds and 
the distribution of kickbacks to the political circles. 
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Under the new structure the traditional distinction between business crime, responsible for dealing with 
administrations and politicians, and the mafia proper, responsible for controlling the economic catchment 
area to which extortion is applied, is blurred. 
In this respect, to state that organized crime is a priority means to recognize that it still poses a serious 
threat to economic and social development, that it affects not only the functions entrusted to the State 
machinery, but also the actual running of the State's legal system: the meaning of the laws passed by 
Parliament, the monopoly of coercive violence and the primacy oflaw, the pactum civitatis itself. 
2.3 Cosa Nostra's new organizational set-up 
Over a period of six years eighteen thousand people have been charged with belonging to mafia-style 
organizations: even though it is no longer unthinkable for sentences passed on Cosa Nostra's members, 
including the chiefs, to become final, the discrepancy between the relatively rapid identification of 
members by the police and the time needed to arrive at the fmal sentence is blatant. Of course, it was only 
in early 1992 that bosses and sidekicks of organized crime lost their inveterate certainty of impunity. And 
yet even this first serious attempts on the part of the Italian State at reclaiming the power usurped by the 
mafia counter-State is accompanied by controversy. 
In other words, the new anti-crime institutions - the DIA (Direzione lnvestigativa Antimafia), the DNA 
(Direzione Nazionale Antimafia), the district-based public prosecutions departments - are up and running. 
and the potential of systematic action against mafia's territorial links undertaken by the judiciary is 
obvious. But the controversy over the pentiti is still open. The unity and cohesion of the State remain an 
objective, as confirmed by the lamentations of some over the traumas caused by the discovery of 
connections between the mafia and politico-institutional sectors. 
Following the decline of subversive terrorism, with two years of car-bomb attacks Cosa Nostra's chiefs 
have revived the politics of bloodshed (from Capaci* to the Accademia dei Georgofili**) against Italy's 
most representative men and sites. 
The path of the fight against organized crime in Italy is not one-way, as witnessed by the large numbers 
involved in the judicial action brought against it. With nearly 900 men deserting the organization to help 
with the enquiries, who does what within mafia's organization today is an open question. 
2.4 Building a portrait of the mafia 
Analysis of "dirty" economic activities, reconstruction of mafia's military connections, identification of 
lines of influence between crime and politics are the three areas of permanent interest for the 
investigations into mafia's new landscape. There is a fourth area of research which is no less vital for 
investigations aimed at keeping up with changes in mafia's control lines, i.e. the sociological and 
psychological factors underlying Cosa Nostra's underworld. 
How are the various organizational structures linked and which principles ensure their survival and 
smooth running? Which bonds - interest, social identity, kinship - account for mafia's extraordinary 
longevity? What are the options open to those who wish to relinquish their status, be they "men of 
honour" or rank and file? 
From the answers given to these questions depends the correct approach to the problem posed by 
informers and pentiti. A vast amount of information, statements and factual data is now available on 
the structure of various criminal organizations, and of Cosa Nostra in particular. 
This enables more in-depth analysis of one aspect of organized crime, especially in the light of modem 
economic organization theory which foresees significant problems arising in the selection and 
coordination of staff and with corporate incentive policy when a large number of individuals come 
together and operate within an organization, since each individual will pursue goals which are only in part 
consistent with those pursued by the management. Using such adapted theoretical models, the conflicts 
Translator's note: the town where magistrate Giovanni Falcone was assassinated. 
Translator's note: the site of a car-bomb attack in Florence, intended to hit one of Italy's most prestigious monuments. 
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among Cosa Nostra families have been analyzed, in particular the instances where the Corleonesi*** 
have resorted, in addition to violence and the wiping-out of rival bands, to a skilful and gradual 
destabilization of their opponents. 
The enemy front has been weakened from the bottom, by eroding the other groups' internal cohesion and 
replacing key members with new and "friendlier" management. Only then was the frontal attack on the 
remaining organizations launched, leading to copious bloodshed during the "mafia wars". The net 
outcome of Cosa Nostra's leaden years is that the winners have gained control without achieving balance, 
and it is to be hoped that the State will recognize - and there are encouraging signs - the intrinsic 
weakness of the Corleonesi's winning strategy: the potential instability of secret and criminal 
organizations. And since the ascent of the Corleonesi was achieved through destabilization from within of 
rival families, it has entailed an overall weakening of the general rules which have been Cosa Nostra's 
code of conduct until the 80s. One of these rules is absolute loyalty, no longer towards Cosa Nostra, 
however, but rather towards the boss. All this foreshadows control and internal cohesion mechanisms 
which, in the long run, might prove less effective than the preceding ones. The fact that even some of the 
Corleonesi chiefs have joined the ranks of the pentiti seems to bear out this conclusion most 
encouragingly. 
2.5 Drugs: the forgotten problem? 
Curiously forgotten, after the heated discussions it provoked in the late 80s and the fireworks of the "war 
on drugs", the issue of policies to control drug abuse retains strategic significance. Following the defeat of 
the "military" option and disillusionment with the approach based on repression at the consumer end, the 
new element in the global drug market is the disappearance of the traditional distinction between 
countries producing, supplying and marketing drugs, and consumer countries. This went hand in hand 
with the distinction between developing and developed countries, and it is now outdated. 
The problem of ensuring consistency between policies to curb the supply - i.e. trafficking and dealing -
and policies to reduce demand is back with us. The solution - now that the ideological quandaries have 
been left behind - is based on rigorous analysis of the socio-economic models underlying the main options 
available. This involves painstakingly looking at all possible variants, from total prohibition to partial 
prohibition, from decriminalization to regulation and from legalization coupled with high taxation to full 
liberalization. 
2.6 Ways forward: better knowledge, better coordination 
The fight against crime seems to suffer from a tendency to either amplify the magnitude of the problems it 
seeks to tackle or to celebrate the results obtained. This leads to a low propensity to adapt institutional 
instruments to the changes affecting the structure of organized crime. To say nothing of the persistent 
shortcomings in the coordination of institutional strategies, notwithstanding the good results achieved by 
the new bodies set up in 1992 (e.g. DNA, DDA - Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, DIA and the 
specialized squads in the three branches of the State police). 
Detectives have accumulated a vast knowledge on the dynamics of organized crime. This wealth of 
information must be pooled and made available for the purpose of fighting crime. To do so it is necessary, 
even for scholars, to abandon the habit of debating in a vacuum, with total disregard for the vast amount 
of documentary evidence made available through the legal proceedings. This is one case of the theory 
lagging behind the practice in the form of the exceptional experience accumulated by operators in the 
field. It is a limitation which can no longer be condoned. 
Translator's note: those from Corleone, a mountain village in the Palermo province closely associated with rnafia. 
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II. The new mafia 
by Pier Luigi VIGNA15 
3 The end of the Cold War and the blurring of external and internal 
security threats 
Although the end of the Cold War has put international relations on a new footing and improved 
communications between states, it has given criminal organizations, and especially the Mafia in all its 
forms, greater scope to operate internationally. 
During the Cold War, the stagnant political situation in Italy, which gave rise to a kind of coalition 
politics, allowed Mafia-type organizations to profit from preserving the status quo. However, such 
organizations have the ability to adapt to new situations (e.g. to new markets or new sectors of 
intervention) which fits in extremely well, according to my analysis of the situation, with another of 
the Mafia's essential characteristics, by which I mean its "expansivity", or tendency to spread. 
In other words, the fall of communism and the ensuing expansion of the market provided Mafia-type 
organizations with a golden opportunity to display both their adaptability and their expansivity. 
Given these characteristics, it was not difficult to forecast that Mafia-type organizations would 
increase their international presence. They did this mainly by: 
"dematerializing" their criminal activities by feeding the proceeds into the international economic circuit, 
following the typical route taken by the illegal economy (i.e. from rich countries to poor countries - the 
opposite route to that taken by the legal economy). This phenomenon, which also occurs in the national 
economic sector, can lead to the "social recycling" of criminals; 
increasing contacts between the leaders of the most powerful international criminal organizations. 
The consequences of the above are: 
to strengthen the power of criminal organizations in the poorest countries, creating dangerous poles of 
attraction that can undermine new democracies, and to allow a state to use its criminal organizations to 
destabilize another state; 
to create not only horizontal exchanges, which have always existed between criminal organizations in 
different countries, but also relations at vertical level. 
In Italy there is already evidence of this "verticalization" of criminal groupings in the sense that 
Mafia-type associations other than Cosa Nostra (e.g. 'ndrangheta, camorra, Sacra Corona unita) have 
been moving from horizontal forms of association towards a more pyramidal structure, and have 
sought to achieve a unified command structure by having some of their representatives affiliate to 
Cosa Nostra. 
It is quite easy to imagine this extended to the international context, with organized crime setting up a 
supranational chain of command. 
One of the most dangerous sectors since the end of the Cold War has been the international arms trade; 
since it is much more conspicuous than movements of illegal capital, it is a useful warning light. 
15 Chief Prosecutor, Florence' s Office of the Prosecutor. 
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In a report I wrote in February 1993, taking my cue from some observations made by the DIA (Italy's 
Mafia Investigation Department) and from the outcome of some criminal proceedings which I dealt 
with, I suggested that one of the reasons pushing criminal organizations to procure ever more 
sophisticated arms (technological progress, resolving conflicts with other groups, achieving a 
dominant position in the criminal world, attacking the power of the state) was connected with the 
internationalization of crime. 
Our own criminal organizations are now in touch with powerful foreign criminal groupings, some of 
which (in Colombia, for example) run full-scale armies which means they purchase arms as much out 
of emulation as out of operational needs; more importantly, links are being established with foreign 
Mafia-type organizations (in Russia and the former Yugoslavia, for example) which, because of the 
relaxation in arms controls, or infiltration from or cooperation with the armed forces, have access to 
highly sophisticated armaments which can be made available to criminal groups in other countries via 
international transactions (e.g. drugs for arms). 
All this explains why criminal and security policy has taken on new meaning since the end of the Cold 
War. As regards security policy, when the Italian law on the security services (SISDE and SISMI) 
came into force in 1977, there was a clear distinction between internal threats and those from beyond 
our borders: internally, the greatest danger came from terrorism (both from left and right); externally, 
the main danger was the threat of nuclear world war. 
Although political and military instability, which is often a consequence of extreme ethnic nationalism 
( or tribalism) or religious fanaticism, poses dangers in some areas today, the most serious threat stems 
from the links the various national criminal organizations have with each other; these organizations are 
now finding that countries suffering from political instability offer more scope and richer rewards, so 
both the dangers mentioned above are now combined. 
To react to this, the security services need restructuring: in other words, they should no longer reflect 
the old internal/external dichotomy ( e.g. SISDE/SISMI). 
To counter the danger of strengthened international criminal link-ups (and the resulting capital 
movements), not only do judicial and police structures need to become more like communicating 
vessels, but the bodies dealing with external and internal criminal activities need to exchange 
information and data much more than they do at present. 
4 The Russian Mafia 
The surge of the Russian mafia represents the most important evolution of the mafia phenomenon. For 
the purpose of the analysis, its activities can be classified as: (a) organized crime in the Russian 
Federation; (b) the expansion of Russian criminal activities in the USA; (c) the activities of Russian 
criminal organizations in Europe. 
4.1 Organized crime in the Russian Federation 
According to the figures for 1993, there were 7 OOO cases of dealing in forged dollars, 8 200 cases 
involving the manufacture or pushing of drugs, 300 cases involving clandestine drugs laboratories, 
9 OOO cases of arms trafficking, 29 213 cases of murder, 120 089 cases of armed robbery and 
4 500 cases of corruption. There were 53 200 convictions relating to drug trafficking and 54 tonnes of 
drugs were seized; 11 chairmen or directors of banks were killed by the Russian mafia and 27 car 
bombs targeted at them were exploded; about 1 million people were arrested (source: "Viaggio a 
Criminopoli", a study carried out as part ofConfcommercio's Penelope project). 
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In their numerous gunfights with criminals, 99 Russian Federation policemen were killed during the 
first eight months of 1993 compared with only 14 for the same period in 1992. In 1991, the prison 
population was 570 OOO, out of a total population of more than 150 million. 
The annual turnover of the Russian mafia is estimated ( op. cit.) at USD 100 billion from the Russian 
drugs market, USD 20 billion from drugs exports, USD 20-30 billion from illegal exports, 
USD 60-80 billion from arms and nuclear trafficking, USD 100 billion from laundering. It is estimated 
that the mafia controls 35% of commercial banks (700 out of 1 800), 40% of state industry, 35% of 
private companies and 60% of commercial enterprises (three categories totalling approximately 
40 OOO firms which all have to pay tax, bribes and protection money of between 10 and 20% of their 
company revenues), not to mention 80% of joint ventures with the West. 
A recent opinion poll conducted in Russia showed that 80% of businessmen were convinced that "it is 
not possible to make money in Russia without breaking the law". Asked whether it was necessary to 
pay bribes to corrupt State officials, 90% said yes; many admitted to having bribed customs officers 
(65%), members of the republican parliaments (52%), police officers (32%), and judges or prosecutors 
(27%). 
According to the Russian Ministry for the Interior, there has been a marked increase in financial crime 
over the last few years, with the actual figure probably being much higher than the official statistics 
indicate because of the number of offences which go undetected or unreported: cases of corruption 
increased from 2 691 in 1990 to 4 919 in 1994, cases of forgery from 93 to 14 884 and illegal foreign 
currency transactions from 977 to 9 339. 
According to the President of the Russian Parliament, Rybkin, 40% of the Russian economy is 
involved in illegal and clandestine operations; he is quoted in the daily "Rossijsokie vesti" as saying 
that in the last four years more than USD 100 billion has been illegally exported from Russia and 
capital outflows are now running at more than USD 2.5 billion a month. 
According to some recent studies, ten of the 25 largest commercial banks have links with organized 
crime and call on the mafia to recover their bad debts; in 1994, 89 people in Moscow alone were killed 
in related shoot-outs. 
On 23 May 1993, the Italian Parliament's Anti-Mafia Committee heard 
General Aslanbeek A. Aslahnov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Bilateral Committee on Legality, 
Public Order and the Fight against Crime, on the links between organized crime in the ex-USSR and 
the world of politics. In a reply to a question from a member of the Committee, he said: 
"I'll give you an example. Take what happened in Georgia: when the new President, Gamsalrurdia, was 
elected he launched a slogan "Georgia for the Georgians", a nationalist slogan which ordinary people 
didn't really understand because they weren't used to slogans of that type; however some people 
understood it pe,fectly well: criminals understood that they could use the slogan as a cover for their 
criminal activities. Two mafia big-shots joined Gamsalrurdia's entourage and made it right to the top -
one became Minister for Defence and the other became Deputy Prime Minister. As Government 
Ministers, their actions were dictated by their other interests which they set out to promote thanks to the 
greater freedom of action that nationalism and separatism gave them. They are not in power at the 
moment, as elections were held recently and there has been a change of government. However, at the top 
of the State and the armed forces are many of their allies who committed crimes during the Soviet era. 
Now the new regime is in place, they justify their past crimes by saying they were committed against the 
communist regime; in other words, they are painting their criminal activities as a patriotic political stand 
against the previous regime. " 
In reply to another member of the Committee, General Aslahnov said: 
''As regards the question concerning the links between organized crime and the world of politics, there is 
no doubt that the latter has provided a favourable terrain in which crime can flourish. There are many 
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parties (perhaps it might be better to call them factions) which are all fighting each other to obtain power, 
thereby weakening authority and its institutions. 
I can give you an example of a direct link between the political and criminal worlds. It is something which 
needs to be seen with one's own eyes, otherwise it is difficult to believe: whenever a new firm starts up or 
an exhibition of paintings is mounted, you will always see at the inauguration well-known criminals in 
double-breasted jackets standing alongside politicians and greeting each other. " 
There is a considerable body of evidence pointing to this link between the Mafia and the world of politics. 
For example, after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, a number of proceedings were initiated to investigate 
the links between leading party members or civil servants and members of the criminal fraternity. The 
secretary of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, Georgadze, turned out to be closely connected with 
one of the most powerful criminal bosses, Kueulorija. When the latter died, in the mid-1980s, a number of 
well-known Moscow politicians and artists attended the funeral. According to the Ministry for the 
Interior, a well-known criminal called Ivan'kov, who is currently resident in Germany,1 6 turned up to 
discuss the subject of privatization with the Moscow authorities. 
In this connection, privatization has been pinpointed as one of the sectors most used for laundering money 
from criminal activities. Much property which used to belong to the State is now for sale on the free 
market, including buildings, firms, hotels and factories. 
Although the average Russian citizen does not have the capital to take advantage of the privatization 
programme, criminals have found it an excellent way of laundering and investing their illicit earnings. 
According to the Russian police, criminals are successfully using the privatization programme to obtain a 
share in the control of the economy of many large and small cities. 
At the Conference on Russian Organized Crime held in Vienna on 20 September 1994, 
General Alexandr Gromov, Director of the Russian Tax Police, said that evidence of money-laundering 
had been found in bank operations involving: the exchange of roubles for foreign assets; the creation of 
networks of fictitious companies (mainly insurance companies); the infiltration of business by criminal 
gangs by means of credit extorted to set up profitable business; and the infiltration by criminals of 
executive boards or company security services. 
According to expert studies, the Russian Mafia had a turnover of more than USD 150 billion in 1994 and 
directly controlled 35% of commercial banks, 40% of industry and 80% of joint ventures. 
In February 1994, President Yeltsin declared that "organized crime is trying to get the country in a 
stranglehold" and that his Government's first priority was to tackle organized crime and the economy. 
According to General Gennadhi Cebotariov ( quoted in "Viaggio a Criminopoli"), there are 5 700 criminal 
groups operating in Russia employing 114 OOO people full time; if one adds to these all the helpers and 
those working in related sectors, the total comes to around 3 million people for whom Mafia activity 
represents their main source of income. 
The 5 700 groups referred to above are the first level and are composed mainly of simple bands of 
criminals. However, about 500 of them have 200-300 members each and operate as proper Mafia 
"cosche"; these constitute the second level and they exercise control over the territory by recruiting 
smaller bands or keeping them in line by the use of violence. 
Although many of these "cosche" operate locally and independently of one another, about 150 make up a 
third level and form part of a coordinated network. It is at this level that the Mafia becomes entwined with 
the non-criminal world and in some cases with State institutions. 
According to an Interior Ministry source, there are about 500 high-level criminals who occupy positions 
as civil servants or businessmen and who are apparently above suspicion. It is this group which controls 
16 These and other items of information are also covered by Violante in "None la piovra", Einaudi, Turin, 1994. 
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organized crime much as it would a cartel. From the evidence, therefore, it is clearly a dangerous illusion 
to "justify" the Russian Mafia by claiming that it helps the transition to a market economy, discourages 
other types of "disorganized" crime, acts as a mediator in disputes, and ensures that contracts are 
respected. 
The Italian experience shows that in reality the Mafia operates only according to its own criminal 
interests, making it impossible to distinguish between the legal economy and the illegal one by investing 
the proceeds of its activities (drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, extortion, etc.) in seemingly lawful 
business activities, and re-investing the profits in various kinds of illegal traffic, thus fuelling a vicious 
circle that undermines the whole economy. 
The problem becomes even more acute, in view of the weakness of political institutions, the legal system 
and the police, when one appreciates that criminal groups in the CIS have close links with the bureaucracy 
and politicians. 
Unless decisive action is taken, it is easy to predict that Russian organized crime will soon take on the 
"military", political and financial characteristics of the Italian Mafia and will move on from being simply a 
"military organization" to becoming an "integrated criminal system", with Mafia groups aligning 
themselves closely with business and political lobbies, secret societies and suchlike. 
It should be remembered that however much of a virtue we make pragmatism to be, it is unacceptable for 
a society to be founded on crime or to model its behaviour on the Mafia. 
In the last two years, leading Russian criminals have begun to travel to the west and some of them are 
known to have spent several months in the United States. These visits suggest the existence of a command 
structure linking criminal groups in both continents. 
4.2 The expansion of Russian criminal activities in the USA 
The development of Russian organised crime in the USA is worth analysing because it could be a 
harbinger of what could happen in W estem Europe. 
• Russian criminal organizations in the USA have the following principal characteristics: 
• their roots are in large Russian emigre communities such as Brighton Beach and New York; 
• they specialize in white-collar and financial crimes; 
• they maintain links with the former Soviet Union; 
• they operate under changing codes without owing allegiance to any specific leader or organization; 
• they sometimes cooperate with other organized ethnic criminal groups such as the Italian 
Cosa Nostra; 
• they have little respect for the American legal and judicial system; 
• they sometimes resort to extreme forms of violence. 
Russian organized crime in the USA has been described as a multiform alliance of emigres from the former 
Soviet Union which was set up to carry out criminal activities and to generate illicit revenue. Some of its 
characteristics, though, may appear contradictory: although there is the appearance of "disorder", there 
nonetheless exists a well-structured network, even if no single control committee has been identified. 
However, there is some evidence to suggest that a more compact national structure is being set up. 
The main areas of activity are financial and white-collar crime, such as money-laundering, tax evasion, 
credit card fraud, bank and insurance frauds, forgery, not to mention drugs trafficking, extortion and 
prostitution. 
Other sectors in which Russian criminal organizations operate are contraband fuel and health insurance 
frauds (with the complicity of doctors and lawyers). 
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The members of these organizations often resort to extreme violence and ferocity and the conspiracy of 
silence which characterizes the Russian community makes it particularly difficult to carry out homicide 
investigations. 
Many Russian criminals now operating in the USA have experienced the brutality of the Soviet prison 
system and the fact that they survived it adds to their reputation and the respect in which they are held by 
their associates. The USA's judicial and penitentiary system is no deterrent; one Russian criminal is 
reported to have asked: "what could be worse than the KGB and the Gulag?" 
4.3 The activities of Russian criminal organizations in Europe 
The new international strategic framework which formed after the collapse of the Communist regime 
brought to an end the rigid system of government control over various sectors of national life and released 
large amounts of "sensitive materials" and human resources into the marketplace. 
This created favourable conditions on the international market for the expansion of illegal activities and 
Russian criminal organizations began entering into contact with European criminal elements, attracted by 
the possibility of using Western European countries for drugs trafficking, money-laundering, or for 
distributing forged banknotes. They have also become involved in trafficking arms and technology, 
including sensitive materials. 
Jn Finland, there is evidence of them trafficking in spirits, precious metals and stolen boats. 
The proceeds from these illegal activities are converted into sound currencies and invested in property in 
Switzerland, France, Germany, Greece and Italy. 
In 1992, the Swiss legal authorities announced that a large amount of money had arrived in Switzerland to 
be laundered through the Swiss banking system. A specially set up Swiss export company had banked 
money of dubious provenance, supposed to be payment for a commercial transaction with a fictitious 
Russian company - a transaction which never actually took place. 
Trafficking in nuclear materials is also taking place between Russia, Switzerland, Italy and the Arab 
countries. 
As regards trafficking in Russian arms, whether ordinary or military weapons, most of the material comes 
from thefts from ex-Soviet army barracks which have fallen into the hands of various nationalist 
movements whose activities are not easy to monitor. 
Russian arms have also been seized from Italian criminal organizations: for example, on 
20 February 1993, the police intercepted a consignment of Russian arms in Milan - the arms came from 
Croatia and were intended for the Calabrian 'ndrangheta; in July 1993, in the province of Salemo, two 
camorra vehicles were intercepted with four Russian anti-tank bazookas on board; again in 1993, in the 
province of Lecce, explosives, detonators, anti-personnel bombs and anti-tank weapons, machine guns 
and ammunition were seized in four separate operations - all the material was of ex-Soviet origin. 
Another police operation called Europa I took place in Locri (Calabria, Italy) in 1993 and was directed 
against a 'ndrangheta group; it emerged that a holding company, which was headed by one of the 
criminals, had been involved in sales and purchase transactions totalling billions of roubles and hundreds 
of millions of dollars, although its registered capital was minimal. 
In operation Wall Street, carried out by the Milan police in 1993, it was established that the 'ndrangheta 
were setting up cells in Eastern European countries, particularly in Poland and Hungary. 
In addition, members of the Camorra belonging to the Licciardi clan have been making contact with 
Russian criminal groups. 
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Some sales outlets for contraband cigarettes in Italy are beginning to stock cigarette packets which have 
the place of manufacture in cyrillic letters, indicating that Italian Mafia groups running the contraband 
trade are in permanent touch with their Russian counterparts. 
Five tonnes of contraband cigarettes produced in Eastern Europe were recently seized on the outskirts of 
Palermo. 
According to Leonid Fituni, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who obtained the 
information from the Russian police's organized crime department, a secret agreement was reached in 
1992 between the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and criminal groups in the Soviet Union, the purpose of which was 
to set up a network for marketing nuclear components and drugs produced in the ex-Soviet republics. First 
contacts took place in March and June 1991 in Warsaw, followed by further meetings in Moscow. 
Russia is the only example of a nuclear power where a high rate of criminal activity is combined with 
political and economic instability. 
Russia is also involved in international trafficking of narcotic substances. 
According to an official in the Russian Federation's Ministry for the Interior, highly qualified chemists are 
working on the production of synthetic drugs. Russia is also a transit country between Afghanistan and 
other Asian countries and Europe. 
4.4 The expansion of Italian criminal organizations into Eastern Europe 
An important source on the activities of Italian organised crime in Eastern Europe are the submissions to 
the Italian authorities by Antonio Pansa, a former member of Sacra Corona Unita - the mafia-like 
organisation of Apulia. 
According to Pansa1', Italian criminals are looking towards the East, and particularly Russia, for two 
reasons: the virtual absence of attempts to stop money-laundering, and the sheer amount of illegal capital 
being generated there, both of which make the region a focus for all sorts of criminal activity. The 
activities of Italian organised crime in Eastern Europe can be characterised as follows: 
• Russia: as early as 1990, Neapolitan criminal groups under the direction of the Licciardi clan started 
taking an interest in Eastern Europe; in 1991 the Cutrera brothers were doing deals worth tens of 
thousands of dollars in Russia; in 1992-1993, 'ndrangheta groups attempted to concentrate their 
capital in a St Petersburg bank and take it over. 
At the end of 1993, it was established that an organization made up mainly of Calabrians, including 
Filippone Salvatore, had gained control of a number of commercial and financial companies in Italy, 
Switzerland and other countries which they were using to set up a front of business activities such as 
property investment, dealing in works of art, company acquisitions, and dealing in classic and luxury 
cars. They were also trying to acquire a huge amount ofroubles (the equivalent of LIT 2 600 billion) 
to gain control of a large St Petersburg bank, as well as to buy a Russian refinery and steelworks. The 
organization's representatives had also established contact with representatives of the political world, 
both in Russia and in Eastern and Western European countries. 
During the course of various enquiries, the Sicilian Mafia were also found to be interested in 
acquiring roubles in exchange for narcodollars. 
• Romania: in Romania, the Italian criminal organizations act mainly as investors. There are about 
3 OOO joint ventures with European businessmen, most of them Italian; high-ranking members of the 
Romanian political hierarchy are involved with some of them, attracted by the opportunity to make 
easy money. 
Italian and Romanian criminal groups are hoping to use these investments to exploit the 
privatization process now going on, especially as current legislation does not provide for checks 
to be carried out on the legality or otherwise of the capital employed. 
17 Submission by A. Pansa to Anti-Mafia Investigation Division (DIA), Counnayeur, 18-20 June 1994. 
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When Domenico Libri, a member of the 'ndrangheta, was arrested on 16 September 1992, it was 
established that he had called various Romanians from Marseilles to discuss setting up a company 
for importing Italian building materials. 
• Hungary: enquiries have shown that the so-called Brenta mafia, which operates in Italy's Triveneto 
region, has been investing in Austria, from where the money is channelled to other countries, 
Hungary in particular. One of the ways oflaundering the money is casinos (25 in Hungary and 13 in 
Budapest alone). In November 1992, Lombardo Giulio, who had links with the Nuova Camorra 
Organizzata (NCO) was spotted in Hungary. In Hungary it is still possible to have a numbered bank 
account. 
• Bulgaria: Bulgaria's location makes it a useful transit point for drugs but it is thought that entry to the 
market is only possible by agreement with other mafia organizations operating there (Turkish ones in 
particular) or with the complicity of the authorities. There is little evidence for links between local 
organizations and Italian organized crime since the country is not yet completely open. In the arms 
sector, it supports Slovenia and Croatia, as well as its neighbour Serbia. 
• Poland: crime is increasing all the time, with many opportunities for obtaining a slice of the cake. 
Mafia organizations from the Ukraine and Russia would appear to be moving in on the weaker local 
organizations, with the help of Italian criminal groups. 
• Czech and Slovak Republics: bank legislation in these two countries tends to favour 
money-laundering. According to some reports, there was a meeting in 1992 in Prague between Italian 
and Russian mafia leaders to reach agreement on money-laundering and the drugs traffic, the city thus 
became the spearhead for Italian mafia interests in Eastern Europe. 
According to Russian officials, "agreement was reached on how to coordinate activities. The 
Italians ... want to teach their Russian 'colleagues' how to launder illicit earnings, while the latter 
want to take over the shipment and distribution of drugs". "The Italian mafia would receive 
uranium, radioactive materials and sophisticated weapons stolen from Russian army stores and 
from the stores of former Soviet republics with the help of the security services and other 
high-ranking officers. In exchange, the Russian Mafia would receive drugs, especially cocaine, 
which would be sold in Eastern Europe, Russia and other republics or smuggled into Western 
Europe through the police and the frontier with Germany." 
A successful meeting was apparently held in Lucerne between American, Italian, Russian and 
Ukrainian mafia representatives. The meeting covered the expansion of cooperation on drugs 
trafficking in Western Europe as well as other illegal activities such as smuggling arms, paintings 
or antiques. The participants at the meeting were all agreed on the increased role of Russia and of 
the Central Asian Republics in laundering money accumulated in Western Europe in the drugs 
trade and other illegal activities. 
In the Slovak Republic, Yugoslav, Russian and Ukrainian criminal organizations are all involved 
in arms, drugs, military technology or radioactive materials, together with their Italian 
counterparts. 
• Ex-Yugoslavia: the dismembering of the country and the explosion of ethnic and religious conflicts 
provides fertile ground for penetration by foreign criminal groups, including those from Italy, 
involved in the drugs trade, the trade in foreign-processed tobacco (the coast of Montenegro is heavily 
frequented by boats belonging to criminal associations from Puglia), and the arms trade. 
• Albania: criminal groups from Apulia in Italy are exploiting their traditional links with Albania 
(supply of foreign-processed tobacco) and expanding their activities in the field of drugs, arms, 
explosives; they are also forming alliances with local criminal bands. 
The evidence for this is that many Italians have been arrested in Apulia for trafficking in arms and 
tobacco from Albania; moreover, large numbers of Italian citizens, mostly from Salento, are present 
in the main Albanian towns, and numerous business activities have been set up in Albania by Italians. 
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Ill . The financing of criminal organizations, money 
laundering and the banking and the banking and financial 
system: Europe in an international context 
by Donato Masciandaro " 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, in the light of an economic analysis, the relationships 
between the finances of organized crime, money laundering and banking and financial markets from 
an international standpoint. The paper, which summarizes some of the results of the author's work in 
this field (see references), is organized as follows. The first part explains the crucial part which the 
laundering of illegal funds plays in the expansion of criminal organizations; the second part analyses 
the reasons why the banking and financial system is particularly suited to money laundering, whilst the 
third part discusses the European and international dimensions of the phenomenon and the policies 
that should be adopted. 
5 Criminal organizations and money laundering: The relevance of 
the phenomenon 
Is it really so important to combat money laundering? This question must be asked without hypocrisy for 
at least two reasons: on the one hand, it would seem that the need to combat these activities is growing at 
both national and international levels; on the other hand, anti-laundering action is expensive, both for the 
economy in general and the banking and financial sector in particular. The answer is in the affirmative in 
view of the qualitative and quantitative extent of this particular illegal financial activity. 
At the qualitative level, there is no doubt that laundering enables any criminal and/or illegal organization 
or person to increase their economic weight and, therefore, their social and political weight. The reason is 
that laundering has a very special economic function, i.e., to transform the potential purchasing power of 
the proceeds of unlawful activities into effective purchasing power, solely to the advantage of the 
criminals who are in possession of such liquidity. 
Of course persons engaged in criminal activities may have other reasons for injecting capital into the 
banking and financial system, for instance in order to invest in a particularly profitable industry. These 
reasons do not, however, affect the analysis: once the laundering has completed its task of separating the 
liquidity from its illegal source, the procedure becomes a matter of the usual investment and portfolio 
options. 
Let us consider how money laundering helps to strengthen criminal activities: the initial unlawful act 
produces the liquidity for laundering; after deducting laundering costs, this can then be invested in 
legal or illegal sectors of the economy. The share invested in illegal activities will produce fresh cash, 
requiring laundering. The laundering cycle is thus set in motion and, with every step, if nothing 
impedes the machinery, the financial and economic strength of the criminals is increased. 
This process can be illustrated by a simple analytical model which is also capable of producing some 
indication, albeit only preliminary, of the quantitative extent of the phenomenon, based for the first time 
on economic analysis and subject, of course, to the usual precautions. 
18 Professor of Economics, University of Bocconi, Milan 
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This having been said, it is possible to produce not estimates but simulations based on the data available. 
Let us take a specific illegal act, such as the manufacture and trafficking of drugs, and examine how it 
promotes the development of money laundering and vice versa. 
According to unofficial estimates (CENSIS), for example, the Italian drug market in 1983 produced, from 
an initial profit of LIT 22 OOO billion, a total laundering turnover of some LIT 76 OOO billion, of which 
total costs accounted for LIT 19 OOO billion, leaving LIT 57 OOO billion to be reinvested. 
The theoretical model also gives an idea of the possible effects of a variation in the effectiveness of 
anti-laundering regulations or developments in laundering techniques resulting in a change in laundering 
costs. If, for example, laundering costs fell from 20% to 10%, the drug industry would, for the same costs 
generate a cash flow requiring laundering of LIT 160 OOO billion: the halving of costs more than doubles 
the illegal proceeds. 
Of course, modifying just one of the basic parameters changes the absolute parameters but not the 
qualitative results. For example, CENSIS, considerably revising its estimates downwards, assessed total 
turnover in the drug industry in Italy at LIT 4 OOO billion in 1990. With such values, and maintaining all 
the other parameters unchanged, laundered money from drugs would total some LIT 14 OOO billion, of 
which LIT 10 500 billion would be reinvested and LIT 3 500 billion is laundering costs. 
By way of comparison, CENSIS estimated that laundered liquidities from theft, extortion, bribery and 
usury amounted in the same year to LIT 3 700 billion, LIT 2 200 billion, LIT 3 700 billion and 
LIT 650 billion respectively. 
According to the Italian Institute for Statistics (1ST AT), the total estimated profits in 1990 generated by 
the manufacture and marketing of drugs of at least LIT 8 100 billion resulted in total laundering activities, 
in this criminal sector alone, of some LIT 28 OOO billion, and a laundering costs of some 
LIT 7 OOO billion. ISTAT figures for 1990 show turnover from theft, extortion and usury totalling 
LIT 6 400 billion, LIT 1400 billion and LIT 1300 billion respectively. 
The disparities between the sizes of figures given above do not alter the final message: combating 
money laundering means not only preventing the growth of an illegal financial activity but also putting 
a brake on the general financial development of criminal organizations as a whole. 
6 The role of banking and the financial system in money 
laundering 
So far the economic analysis of illegal money laundering has been carried out on a general level. It has 
been shown how laundering is an essential factor in the growth of all the other illegal markets; if the 
proceeds are not separated from their illegal sources, it is impossible to reinvest them either legally or 
illegally. Hence the external diseconomies which laundering creates in the economic fabric of a country or 
region by increasing the spread of crime. Let us now concentrate on the banking and financial system. 
Studies on criminal organizations show that, however diversified and international their activities might 
be, they continue to maintain strong roots in their countries of origin. According to the theoretical analysis 
developed in the first part, these roots maximize the economic value of a given laundering operation as 
well as its ties with the various criminal activities present in the territory in question. 
In order to cope with this demand for laundering, the choice of laundering procedure becomes crucial and 
makes it necessary to identify the resources and markets through which it will be directed. Again, the 
awareness of Italian criminal organizations of the problem of control of territory makes certain laundering 
procedures more attractive than others. 
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In this context, banking and financial intermediaries can play an important part because of the relatively 
greater lack of transparency in the markets in which they operate, and their privileged access, whether 
they are criminals or not, to quantities of information. 
The details of banking and financial laundering can be analysed on the basis of the characteristics of the 
functions of intermediaries within the economy. Theoretical studies on intermediation show that financial 
institutions have more information than other operators and that this information is different and special. 
The financial sector is thus particularly suitable for laundering purposes because of two crucial 
characteristics: 
greater than usual lack of transparency, inasmuch as transactions and flows in purchasing power are 
filtered, coordinated and managed by specialized operators; 
privileged position of such intermediaries in terms of information. 
Within the financial sector, banks play a special role, as intermediaries which offer both deposit 
agreements that are fungible for monetary and payment purposes, and loan agreements which cannot 
generally be changed into negotiable assets. Banks can thus be seen as "special" intermediaries inasmuch 
as both their deposit and loan agreements allow them to make considerable economies of scale and to 
diversify in the area of information and management practices, thus becoming, in markets which are by 
definition "opaque", a repository of confidential information on both the beneficiaries of loans and the 
users of payment or other services. 
Thus it is clear that, in such markets as banking and credit where information is neither complete nor 
obtainable without effort, it is easier to conceal purchasing power resulting from illegal transactions or 
business, and that the role and conduct of enterprises (i.e. intermediaries) operating in this market is 
crucial. 
This is why banking intermediaries are of particular interest to criminal organizations: the presence of 
colluding (criminal banks) or inefficient operators (honest but negligent banks) increases their 
opportunities for using the payment or credit systems for a specific end, i.e. laundering, or for the more 
general aims of gaining access to and controlling financial channels. 
Particular attention should be paid to the analysis of criminal banks. These banks are intermediaries 
owned or controlled by criminals, one of their functions being to conceal the origin of profits from illegal 
activities. In other words, laundering by a criminal bank amounts to a transformation process, the input 
being the process to be "cleaned" and the output being the "laundered" and anonymous liquidity. 
A criminal bank may be regarded as particular type of legal enterprise, owned or controlled by criminal 
elements. The reasons why a criminal decides to set up a banking enterprise fall into two main categories: 
first, the general reasons why a criminal organization decides to devote itself to legal activities; second, 
the special (if not unique) suitability of banks for laundering activities. 
This suitability is related to the fact that banks can, to hide the origin of capital, use the range of services 
they supply to with regard to both assets and liabilities. On the liabilities side, bank deposits allow account 
holders to make the maximum use of payment services, fully guaranteed by the bank, and to transform 
illegal proceeds into legal liquidity without the risk of incrimination or identification. This implies, 
furthermore, that all intermediaries, whether banks or not, that are able to offer a range of payment 
services may attract laundering activities. 
Credit management and business services in general not only offer opportunities for laundering in the 
strict sense but for granting credit, not on the basis of any economic criteria but according to objectives 
meeting the needs of criminal organizations. This practice both contributes to the growth of the criminal 
economy and runs counter to the role entrusted to a bank by its depositors, because of the amount of 
information in its possession, namely to check the viability of the projects and enterprises in which the 
funds are invested. 
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A major corollary of the misuse of credit operations is the misuse of the "implicit guarantee" which banks 
give the market regarding the reliability of enterprises. Banks granting or renewing credit to a firm on the 
basis of information in their possession are implicitly expressing a favourable and positive opinion of the 
reliability of a firm, which the latter can then make use of in its relations with other intermediaries on the 
financial markets, and with other parties in general. If, however, credit decisions by criminal banks are not 
based solely on economic considerations, the implicit "rating" service of a bank loan is jeopardized, with 
the resulting negative consequences. 
With regard, however, to the general reasons why banks can satisfy the requirements of criminal 
organizations, these essentially fall into three categories: rationing of investment on illegal markets, 
profitability of investment on legal credit markets, and external economies in terms of control of territory. 
The "rationing" effect: all other things being equal, a criminal bank may be set up because of the need to 
diversify activities, i.e. either diversification in the strict sense, or in order to avoid the effects of rationing 
on illegal markets. 
The "profitability" effect: in the absence of rationing, a criminal organization may consider it viable, in the 
financial sense, to invest capital in the banking sector. The profit may also reflect the competitive 
advantages enjoyed by a person engaged in criminal activities compared with an honest financial operator. 
From this point of view, any competitive advantages enjoyed by a criminal bank depend on the type of 
bank chosen for the analysis. 
"External economies": if there is no rationing, and all other things being equal, a criminal organization 
may consider it desirable to operate a bank in view of the savings it could make in terms of control (in a 
global sense) of the territory in which it and the bank operate. 
It is therefore not possible to rule out the existence of a link between criminal finances and the 
characteristics of the banking and financial system. The link, as demonstrated in the first part of this 
report, is twofold: on the one hand, basic criminal financial activities use banking and financial 
intermediaries for laundering purposes (with or without their knowledge); on the other hand, the more 
efficient the intermediation in hiding and reinvesting funds, the more it fosters the development of such 
activities. 
7 Laundering in Europe and worldwide: The need for coordination 
and incentives? 
Having analysed laundering and the role of banking and financial markets; let us now tum to national and 
international policies. The UN Recommendations of 1994 are more a point of departure than a destination. 
A combination of efficiency and integrity - that is the message, indeed the challenge, facing authorities, 
banking and financial systems and intermediaries, according to the Recommendations adopted by the UN 
in Naples. 
The Recommendations are based on two indisputable facts: firstly, laundering is becoming more and 
more a worldwide problem, increasingly harmful to economies and to society; secondly, preventive and 
corrective measures regularly fail owing to loopholes, in the form of a lack of cooperation by certain 
economic agents, certain professional bodies and certain countries. 
These loopholes explain why it is difficult to define national and international rules to combat laundering 
that are at all effective. The UN Recommendations advocate a multidisciplinary approach; we believe that 
the traditional legal approach, based on sanctions, should be supplemented by a financial approach based 
on incentives, especially on the banking and financial markets. 
As explained above, the banking and financial sector is particularly exposed to the risk of 
contamination: its characteristics of opacity and information are ideal for criminal organizations 
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endeavouring, through laundering, to hide the origin of certain purchasing power flows and inject 
them into legal areas of the economy. 
Financial intermediaries are of considerable interest to both criminal organizations and the authorities 
responsible for public security. The presence of compliant (criminal) or inefficient (honest but careless) 
intermediaries helps the former to use payment and credit systems more easily to attain their objectives. 
But the mass of information held by banks can help the authorities considerably in identifying or proving 
the existence of criminal or unlawful activities. 
Hence the dilemma between effectiveness and integrity applicable both at intermediary and national level. 
It is expensive for intermediaries to follow to the letter the obligations imposed by anti-laundering 
legislation. In addition to the technical costs, there are the costs of loss of confidentiality ( one of the 
traditional advantages of intermediation). An intermediary interested in profits will in practice tend to 
avoid applying a regulation that costs too much and is thus beliable to becoming a corrupt factor in the 
system. There is only one way to solve the problem: rationalize the costs of regulation by introducing 
statutory advantages or incentives. Integrity must be financially advantageous. 
The incentive could take the form of a reward (tax relief or financial benefits), but not necessarily. What it 
must do is alter the costs to profits ratio of the intermediary. For example, if the average customer attaches 
importance to confidentiality, he must be encouraged to be equally concerned about the integrity of his 
bank. An instrument which affected the reputation or smooth running of a dishonest or compliant 
intermediary would provide a solution. 
The same reasoning could be used at international level by the legislators seeking to define 
anti-laundering rules, especially if account is taken of differences in the speed with which laundering has 
developed compared with that with which legislation has been adopted to combat it. One is struck by the 
variety of instruments adopted to deal with a problem perceived as equally urgent by the various countries 
and by the difficulties in coordinating the fight at international level. 
It is possible to identify the seriousness of the problem by constructing an indicator which measures the 
potential demand for anti-laundering rules in each country (industrialized or not) on the basis of data 
collected by the US State Department. According to the results, there are seven industrialized countries, 
with a strong demand for anti-laundering rules: Canada, Germany,Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, of which five are G7 members (Canada, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom and United States) and four are members of the European Union (Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom). If the study is extended to cover countries with an average 
demand for rules, the preceding list would include one member of the G7 (Japan) and two EU members 
(Luxembourg and Spain). 
This finding, and the fact that the industrialized countries account for half the countries with a strong 
demand for regulation and, owing to their economic and financial weight, an undoubtedly greater impact, 
leads to the conclusion that the demand for international regulation chiefly stems from industrialized 
countries and the European continent. 
In response to this demand for regulation, policies have been adopted to combat laundering that are 
generally or specifically applicable to the banking and financial system. Classifying the regulations 
according to quantitative and qualitative criteria reveals that, for the same degree of urgency, the degree of 
severity is dissimilar, especially as between the industrialized countries and non-industrialized countries. 
In addition, there is the difficulty of creating effective coordination machinery. 
What are the reasons for such disparities? Clearly legislators are more or less responsive to the problem of 
laundering according to the cost/benefit analysis of their country. 
Several factors contribute to these differences in responsiveness: it should first be pointed out that the 
need to protect the integrity of financial system by a variety of controls appears to run counter to the 
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banking policies in force, the aim of which is to reduce intervention by the authorities in order increase the 
volume and effectiveness of trade. Such differences in responsiveness are reflected in regulations which 
vary from one country to another: some countries, so as not to impede movements of capital, prefer to 
tolerate certain abuses. 
Faced with this lack of homogeneity, which has strengthened criminal actlVltles, certain countries 
( essentially industrialized countries) have entered a "severity competition", while others ( essentially 
non-industrialized) have, in a more passive and implicit way, adopted a laxist attitude. 
If the two processes (severity and laxism) develop simultaneously, they tend to reinforce each other. This 
increases the gap between the groups involved, in other words between industrialized and 
non-industrialized countries ( despite the fairly considerable differences between the industrialized 
countries themselves, since each one carries out its own analysis). This produces a dangerous regulatory 
dualism which heightens disparities between countries or groups of countries. Transnational criminal 
organizations thus find it easier to "arbitrate" between the different regulations, which makes the strictest 
legislation completely pointless. It is therefore necessary to harmonize regulations by means of 
coordination machinery based on incentives (i.e. providing for transfers or penalties), rather than on 
existing machinery. Coordination agreements are difficult to implement or enforce without such 
incentives, especially in view of the large number of signatories and the weight of each country. 
It would not be difficult to consider introducing a system of international transfers and penalties which 
would reflect the effectiveness of anti-laundering activities in each country, especially in view of the fact 
that the less strict countries in this field often possess weak financial structures which would be very 
sensitive to systems combining transfers and penalties, based on variables relating to income and assets. 
Whilst not recommending the wholesale reintroduction of restrictions on the movement of capital, we 
propose that the principal industrialized countries agree on international rules to identify, control and 
possibly tax financial transactions. Every country would then be invited to recognize the rules by a given 
date. In so doing, each country would accede to the club of countries with unrestricted capital movements. 
Countries which refuse to ratify the agreement should be put in "quarantine" and not included as full 
members of the international financial community. 
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